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The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
It is increasingly clear that the world would be better off with an international
agreement to control greenhouse gas emissions. What remains poorly understood is that
the likely costs and benefits of emissions controls are highly variable across nations.
Most important, prominent projection suggest that the world’s leading emitters--the
United States and China—have weak incentives to participate in an agreement that
would be optimal from the standpoint of the world. The first problem is that any
significant emissions effort would probably be exceedingly expensive for both nations.
The second problem is that on prominent projections, the United States and China are
unlikely to be the most serious losers from climate change. There are two ways to
eliminate the resulting obstacle to an international agreement. The first is through
altering the perceived cost-benefit analysis for both countries. The second is through an
understanding that both nations, and the United States in particular, are under a moral
obligation not to inflict serious harm on the highly vulnerable citizens of Africa, India,
and elsewhere. Existing proposals for unilateral action on the part of the United States
seem to stem from an unruly mixture of confusion, hope, and a sense of moral obligation.
There are also interesting differences between the situations of the two leading emitters:
Because China is much poorer and has much lower per capita emissions, it is especially
difficult to interest China in taking aggressive steps to reduce its emissions.
I.

Introduction

It is now sufficiently clear that the world as a whole would benefit from an
international agreement to control climate change.1 For all the continuing controversy,2
the central features of a desirable agreement are not obscure. First, all significant
*

Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago. Thanks to Jack Goldsmith, Robert Hahn, Saul Levmore, Eric
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1
See William Nordhaus, The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental
Policy (2007), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/DICEGAMS/dice_mss_060707_pub.pdf;
Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (2007). A exceedingly valuable discussion is Richard
B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto (2003)
2
Compare Nordhaus, supra note (calling for modest carbon taxes) and Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It (2007)
(same) with Stern, supra note (calling for aggressive carbon taxes). The difference between Nordhaus and
Lomborg on the one hand and Stern on the other stems largely from a disagreement over the appropriate
discount rate; Stern’s choice of a near-zero rate leads to an analysis that favors far more aggressive cuts.
Stern does not offer nation-by-nation assessments of the costs and benefits of different possible scenarios.
Nordhaus’ most recent work, see id., is based on global assessments and does not show how different
nations would be affected by possible courses of action.

contributors, most prominently the United States and China, should be included, because
the benefits of greenhouse gas reductions depend on broad participation.3 A partial
agreement, even one that includes (say) all of the nations of Europe, will make an
exceedingly modest dent in anticipated warming.4 Second, economic incentives are
indispensable. A carbon tax or a global emissions trading system would be far cheaper
than more rigid alternatives.5 Third, emissions reductions should be relatively modest at
the inception, and they should grow or “ramp up” over time.6 Some people disagree with
this third proposition and support aggressive reductions at an early date7; but the
consensus is against them.8
My central goal in this Article is to explore a serious obstacle to achievement of
an agreement that is, by most accounts, in the world’s interest. The obstacle lies in the
fact that on prominent recent projections, an agreement that is in the interest of the world
as a whole is unlikely to be in the interest of China and the United States, the world’s
leading contributors. It is increasingly clear that the costs and benefits of emissions
reductions are highly variable across nations. On prominent projections, neither China
nor the United States is anticipated to be among the principal victims of climate change.
The circumstances for an international agreement are distinctly unpromising if the
leading emitters do not perceive themselves as likely to gain a great deal from emissions
reductions.

3

See Sheila Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful Second Commitment Period for the Kyoto
Protocol, The Economists’ Voice (May 2007), available at www.bepress.com/ev; Nordhaus, supra note;
Stewart and Wiener, supra note.
4
See Nordhaus, supra note. Consider here the fact that by one assessment, the Kyoto Protocol would
itself reduce anticipated warming by only 0.03 C by 2100, reducing anticipated warming of 1.8 C to 4.0 C
by that very modest amount. See William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World 152 (2000).
Even if the Kyoto Protocol would make more of a dent in warming, no one believes that the dent would be
large; .4 C would be a reasonable upper bound. On one estimate, for example, the reduction would be
between 0.04 and .10 C for one degree warming by 2100, and between .08 and .28 C for 2.5 degree
warming. See Stewart and Wiener, supra note. On this account, the domestic benefits of Kyoto would be up
to .2 prevent of GDP, with the domestic costs being 1 to 2 percent of GDP, by the middle to the end of the
twenty-first century. Id. at 45-46.
5
See Olmstead and Stavins, supra note; William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World 15663 (2000); Stewart and Wiener, supra note.
6
See, e.g., Nordhaus, supra note; Olmstead and Stavins, supra note.
7
See Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (2007).
8
See Nordhaus, supra note.
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To be sure, the current projections are disputed, and the eventual losses might turn
out to be quite high9; but to the extent that they have accepted the recent projections, the
two leading contributors have lacked a strong incentive to help to solve the problem. It
remains clear that purely unilateral emissions reductions by either China or the United
States would not be in the domestic self-interest of either China or the United States.10
The reason is that such unilateral reductions would impose significant domestic costs
and, by themselves, would be unlikely to produce significant domestic benefits. By
contrast, the principal victims of climate change, above all in Africa and India,11 are not
the principal contributors; their own efforts at emissions reduction will do nothing (in the
context of Africa) and close to nothing (in the context of India) about the problem.
In two respects, the situation of China is different from that of the United States,
in a way that might well make the world's leading emitter even less likely to favor
expensive restrictions than the world’s second-leading emitter.12 First, China is relatively
poor, and a relatively poor nation might not be so willing to spend a great deal of money
to protect the world, or itself, from harms that will be most severe a number of decades
from now. Second, China's per capita emissions remain well below those of the United
States, and China has suggested, not implausibly, that a nation with relatively low per
capita emissions should not be treated the same as a nation with very high per capita
emissions.13
Despite these differences, an assessment of the costs and benefits of aggressive
emissions reductions has played a significant role in both nations’ relative indifference to
the problem of climate change. If the world stands to gain from such reductions and if
China and the United States do not, the standard response is simple: The world should

9

For a recent study, suggesting significant losses for a large part of the United States, see Peter Frumhoff
et al., Confronting Climate Change in the U.S. Northeast (July 2007), available at
http://www.climatechoices.org/assets/documents/climatechoices/confronting-climate-change-in-the-u-snortheast.pdf
10
The qualification, discussed below, is that if unilateral action initiates action by others, the domestic
calculation will shift.
11
See, e,.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 91.
12
For China’s refusal to accept emissions limitations, see
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/IER.NSF/0090432fd78725cb85256b57005b95c9/2099c01aa4134c648525731
500058232?OpenDocument
13
See National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, China’s National
Climate Change Programme 58 (June 2007).
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compensate China and the United States for their participation.14 In the context of ozonedepleting chemicals, a solution of this kind was implemented for developing countries.15
For China, we might well expect a similar solution in the context of climate change.16 To
say the least, there are both normative and pragmatic problems with proposing that the
world pay the United States to reduce its emissions, and those problems might well
provide decisive. But the normative issues turn out to be complex and difficult.
My major goals here are simply to explain the complex climate change incentives
of the United States and China, to connect those incentives to the current stalemate, and
to offer some broader lessons about the favorable and unfavorable conditions for an
international agreement to control climate change (and other international problems). But
I also mean to provide an account of how the stalemate might be broken. If the United
States and China do conclude that they have a great deal to gain from an international
agreement, the current situation will shift. Perhaps previous or current perceptions of
domestic costs and benefits are biased or erroneous17; perhaps they omit important
variables.18 If the effort to reconsider domestic benefits and costs fails, the best
alternative is to convince either or both nations that they have a moral obligation to act to
protect those nations that are most vulnerable. There is a strong argument that the United
States, in particular, should scale back its emissions in order to reduce threats to people
who are both poor and at grave risk.19 We shall also see that notwithstanding what I have
14

See Scott Barrett, Environment & Statecraft 346-49 (2004); seee the general treatment of the “Side
Payments Game” in id. at 335-51.
15
See below.
16
See Stewart and Wiener, supra note, at 15.
17
For findings of high costs, see Frumhoff et al., supra note. Frumhoff et al. argue for what they call the
“3 percent solution,” in the form of annual emissions reduction of 3 percent; but they do not show, or
contend, that by itself, this step would produce domestic benefits in excess of costs. Their hope is instead
that steps of this kind might be part of, and help spur, international action.
18
On omitted variables, Bryan K. Mignone, The National Security Dividend of Global Carbon
Mitigation (2007), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1200; Wayne
Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, U Pa L Rev (forthcoming 2007). For an
important discussion of uncertainty and catastrophe, see Martin Weitzman, Structural Uncertainty and the
Value of a Statistical Life in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change (2007), available at
http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1196
For a general account of climate change that emphasizes harmful effects on many nations, see Stern
Review, supra note, and in particular the discussion of extreme events and their consequences, see, e.g., id.
at 149-154. The Stern Review does not, however, contend that aggressive controls would survive domestic
cost-benefit analysis for the United States or for China.
19
An alternative of course is for the United States to assist with adaptation, rather than to reduce its own
emissions rate. On some of the issues involved in mitigation and adaptation, see Stern Review, supra note,
at 622-38; Indur Goklany, The Improving State of the World (2006).
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said here, unilateral action by the United States might well turn out to be feasible,
through some combination of confusion, hope, and a sense of moral responsibility. And if
the United States does act aggressively on its own, China might ultimately be prepared to
act as well.
II.

The Mismatch between the Large Emitters and Nations at Most Serious Risk
My goal in this section is to outline some projections about the anticipated effects

of both climate change and greenhouse gas emission reductions. An important
qualification is necessary at the outset. To say the least, both the science and the
economics are changing, disputed, and based on contentious assumptions, for which
small changes make large differences; indeed, that shall be one of my central themes
here. The purpose is not to set out uncontroversial point estimates, or to suggest that the
particular numbers should be taken to be authoritative. But nations are influenced by a
perception of domestic costs and benefits,20 and to the extent that the world’s leading
emitters believe that the domestic costs of emissions controls would be high, and the
benefits relatively low, their actions will necessarily be affected.
A.

Favorable and Unfavorable Conditions

It is tempting to see international environmental problems as prisoner’s dilemmas,
in which nations have no adequate incentive to reduce their harmful emissions on their
own, but in which all nations would benefit from an enforceable agreement, requiring
reductions on the part of all.21 In situations of this kind, nations gain from coercion to
which they mutually agree. At first glance, climate change might seem to present a
problem of this kind. But as we shall see, the actual picture is far more complex, and the
conditions that have faced the world, in connection with the two leading environmental
problems of the last decades, do not fit the model of the prisoner's dilemma at all.
1. Favorable conditions. In the environmental domain, a logical precondition for a
20

China has refused to agree to emissions limitations on the implausible ground that it does not know its
emissions. It is much more reasonable to think that China does not want to spend high costs for uncertain
benefits. See China “Will Not Accept” Emisisons Limits (July 2007), available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/IER.NSF/0090432fd78725cb85256b57005b95c9/2099c01aa4134c648525731
500058232?OpenDocument
21
For excellent general treatments, see Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of
Environmental Treaty-Making (2004); Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (2004).
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successful international agreement is simple to describe: The major contributors to the
problem must have a great deal to lose if the problem remains unsolved. The situation is
more favorable still if two specific conditions are met: (a) from the standpoint of major
contributors, unilateral action to reduce emissions is desirable and (b) the major
contributors would gain even more from an international agreement than from unilateral
action. Under those conditions, the major contributors will both act on their own and
work aggressively to ensure that other nations act as well. And in that event, the
likelihood of an international agreement will be exceedingly high.
In the context of the problem of ozone depletion, both of the two conditions were
met.22 An agreement was possible in large part because the relevant officials in the
United States, the leading contributor, were entirely aware that the nation’s own citizens
were at grave risk from depletion of the ozone layer.23 Indeed, the United States had so
much to lose from depletion of the ozone layer that purely unilateral action would
produce benefits far in excess of the costs.24 (Several other nations also concluded that
unilateral action was justified.25) In addition, the United States had a great deal to gain
from international action; emissions from other nations would eventually impose
significant harms on American citizens.26
Consider the contemporaneous account, by the Environmental Protection Agency,
of the costs and benefits of the Montreal Protocol27:
Table 1
Costs and Benefits of Montreal Protocol to the United States (in billions of 1985 dollars):
Unilateral Implementation of Montreal
No controls Montreal Protocol
Protocol by the United States
—
3,575
1,363
Benefits
—
21
21
Costs
—
3,554
1,352
Net benefits

22

See Barrett, supra note; Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv
Env L Rev 1 (2007).
23
See Barrett, supra note; Richard Benedict, Ozone Diplomacy (2000).
24
See Barrett, supra note, at 228.
25
James Murdoch and Todd Sandler, The Voluntary Provision of a Public Good: The Case of Reduced
CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol, 63 J Public Economics 331 (1997).
26
Barrett, supra note, at 227-29.
27
See id. at 228.
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These figures were generated from a projection of over five million skin cancer
deaths by 2165, together with over twenty-five million cataract cases by that year—
figures that would be cut to 200,000 and two million, respectively, by a 50% CFC
reduction.28 What is most noteworthy here is that the costs of significant emissions
controls were dwarfed by the benefits of unilateral action. What is almost equally
noteworthy is that the benefits to the United States would be nearly tripled by a worldwide agreement.
With these figures before the White House, President Reagan—not known as an
environmental president—pushed aggressively for the Montreal Protocol.29 Facing strong
pressure from the world’s leading contributor, other countries were willing and able to
agree.30 Indeed, a near-unanimous Senate asked President Reagan to seek aggressive
controls well before the agreement was negotiated,31 and later the Senate unanimously
ratified the Montreal Protocol on the basis of the legislators’ general awareness of the
underlying facts. 32
2. Unfavorable conditions. We can also imagine a situation at the opposite pole,
in which the major contributors to an environmental problem (believe that they) would
not much suffer from it, and hence would lose from an international agreement on
balance, while those who are most vulnerable contribute essentially nothing to the
problem. In the most poignant version of this situation, an international agreement would
produce overall welfare gains, because the most vulnerable nations stand to lose more
from the problem than the contributors would lose from reducing it. This scenario is
poignant because the conditions appear to suggest that an agreement that would be in the
world’s interest will be difficult to achieve, because those who are in the best position to
solve the problem will be most reluctant to do so (at least without side-payments).
Under the assumptions given, unilateral action by the major contributors would
make no sense, certainly not from the standpoint of national self-interest. Worse still, the
28

See Stephen J. DeCanio, Economic Analysis, Environmental Policy, and Intergenerational Justice in
the Reagan Administration, 3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 299,
302 (2003). See id. for more information on how these harms were turned into monetary equivalents and in
particular for discussion of the choice of a low discount rate
29
See Edward Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer 240 (2005); Benedict, supra note.
30
See Barrett, supra note.
31
Benedick, supra note, at 61-62.
32
See http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2135_v88/ai_6495606 (signing statement by
President Reagan, emphasizing Senate unanimity).
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major contributors would also be expected to be highly resistant to an international
agreement, because emissions limitations would produce small domestic benefits and
high domestic costs.33 In the extreme case, an international solution might not be feasible,
at least if the principal contributors are both self-interested and powerful, and if sidepayments are not forthcoming. If those contributors would gain nothing and lose much
from emissions reductions, they have no incentive to act even if all or most other nations
act as well.
The American refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol had everything to do with a
perception of this general kind.34 The United States would have had to spend far more
than other nations to comply with the stated commitments35; on one estimate, the
American share of total costs could be as high as 80 percent.36 And because the
developing countries refused to accept emissions limitations, the United States had
relatively little to gain. On the numbers as they were generated at the time, the United
States would have to spend over $300 billion to comply with the requirements of the
Kyoto Protocol, and the monetized benefits, for the United States, would be about four
percent of that amount.37 A key reason is that the Kyoto Protocol did not impose
emissions limitations on developing nations, and for that reason, it would make a small
dent in warming by 2100 even with full compliance.38
Consider the following projection of the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol
for the United States alone – a projection designed not to offer an undisputed point
estimate, but to describe what prominent analysts suggested when the United States was
making its key decisions 39:

33

A qualification, discussed below, is this: If the contributor nation might benefit from technological
innovations, which could be sold elsewhere, it might be willing to support limits even if it is not greatly at
risk.
34
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html (2001 letter from President
Bush outlining his views on climate change policy)
35
See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note.
36
Stewart and Wiener, supra note, at 10.
37
See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note. Updated and much larger estimates of the cost of Kyoto, for the
United States, are presented in Nordhaus, supra note.
38
See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note (finding a 0.03 C decrease in anticipated warming by 2100);
Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It (2007) (finding a 0.3 F decrease in anticipated warming by 2100).
39
Compiled on the basis of Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 156-67.

8

Table 2
Costs and Benefits of Kyoto Protocol for the United States (in billions of 2000 dollars):
No Controls
Benefits
Costs
Net Benefits

Kyoto Protocol

—
—
—

12
325
–313

Unilateral Action to Comply
with Kyoto Protocol
040
325
–325

From these figures, it should be clear that if the United States acted on its own, or
acted with a small subset of emitters, the benefits from greenhouse gas reductions would
be quite small. Broad participation is necessary to make any real dent in the problem.41 In
1997 a unanimous Senate, apparently aware of this point, adopted Senate Resolution 98,
which asked President Clinton not to agree to limits on greenhouse gas emissions if the
agreement would injure the economic interests of the United States or if it would
“mandate[] new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period” as for the
United States.42 Indeed, the unanimous Senate concluded that any “exemption for
Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate
change and is environmentally flawed” and indicated that it “strongly believed” that the
proposals under consideration “could result in serious harm to the United States
economy, including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and
consumer costs, or any combination thereof.”43
Because the developing nations were not going to agree to emissions limitations,
this request effectively ensured that the United States would not ratify the resulting
agreement.44 And after the negotiation, the Senate unanimously refused to ratify it, on the
basis of a perception that the United States had far more to lose than to gain.45 With
meaningful participation by the developing nations, those benefits would have
significantly increased,46 and the United States would have been more receptive. But to
say this is to get ahead of the story.
40

This estimate is of course rough. It is based on the assumption that unilateral action would have no
significant effect in reducing the harms associated with climate change for the United States.
41
See the detailed treatment in Nordhaus, supra note.
42
http://www.opic.gov/GeneralOPIC/senateresolution98.htm
43
Id.
44
See Sunstein, supra note.
45
Id.
46
See Olmstead and Stavins, supra note.
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There were large efforts, by the United States above all, to convince China and
other developing nations to agree to emissions limitations in the Kyoto Protocol.47 These
efforts were unsuccessful. China did ratify the agreement, to considerable international
fanfare,48 but its ratification was essentially meaningless, because the protocol imposes
no obligations on China at all. In refusing to agree to emissions limitations, China made
an array of equitable arguments, emphasizing its relative poverty, its relatively low per
capita emissions, and the fact that the existing “stock” of greenhouse gas emissions is a
product of the industrialized nations, which benefited from those emissions.49 But there is
no question that China was greatly influenced by two perceptions: it would not greatly
benefit from emissions reductions, and those reductions would cost a great deal. At least
as much as the United States, China was affected by a purely domestic cost-benefit
analysis, which appeared to argue strongly against acceptance of international emissions
reduction requirements.50
Now let us turn to the contemporary situation.
B.

Climate Change Losers

Which nations are expected to suffer most from climate change? Which nations
have least to lose? Of course the precise figures are greatly disputed, and estimates are
constantly changing51; any effort to specify the damage will depend on controversial
scientific or economic assumptions. But it is generally agreed that the poorest nations will
be the biggest losers by far.52 The wealthy nations, including the United States, are in a
much better position for three independent reasons.53 First, they have much more in the
way of adaptive capacity. Second, a smaller percentage of their economy depends on
agriculture, a sector that is highly vulnerable to climate change. Third, the wealthy
47

See Robert Pervical et al., Environmental Regulation 1134 (3d ed. 2000) (“The U.S. effort to obtain
some expression by the largest developing nations of their willingness to constrain their emissions at some
future time was completely unsuccessful.”).
48
See Benedick, supra note, at 196.
49
See Jiahua Pan, Common But Differentiated Commitments: A Practical Approach to Engaging Large
Developing Emitters Under L20 3 (Sept. 20-21, 2004) (available with author) (referring to cumulative
emissions but emphasizing period of 1990-2000, when consequences were widely known).
50
See id.
51
For various accounts, see Stern, supra note; Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, Working Group I, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/; Frumhoff et al., supra note.
52
Stern, supra note, at 139; Richard Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, 21
Environmental and Resource Economics 135 (2002).
53
Stern, supra note, at 139.
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nations are generally in the cooler, higher latitudes, which also decreases their
vulnerability.54 These points should not be taken to suggest that the developed world has
nothing at stake; some projections suggest large losses.55 But all accounts suggest that
wealthy nations are in a far better position to deal with increased temperatures. China is
not wealthy, but it is hardly among the nations most at risk, and indeed “many forecasts
of the impacts of global warming suggest that China would on balance benefit from a
warmer world.”56
In its latest report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projected a
“best estimate” of warming of between 1.8 C and 4.0 C by 2100.57 For essentially all
nations, the anticipated damage would of course be far higher with an increase of 4.0 C
than with an increase of 1.8 C. To get a handle on the problem, let us assume that
warming will be 2.5 C, and consider a prominent estimate of how the harms are likely to
vary across nations and regions58:
Table 3
Damages of a 2.5 C Degree Warming as a Percentage of GDP
India

4.93

Africa

3.91

OECD Europe

2.83

High income OPEC

1.95

Eastern Europe

0.71

Japan

0.50

United States

0.45

China

0.22

Russia

–0.65

On these estimates, it is readily apparent that some nations are far more
vulnerable than others.59 For current purposes, the most noteworthy parts of the list are
54

Id.
See id.; Frumhoff et al., supra note.
56
See Stewart and Wiener, supra note, at 15.
57
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note; Nordhaus, supra note.
58
Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note.
59
Tol, supra note, is in general accord. William Cline, Climate Change, in Global Problems, Global
Solutions 13 (Bjorn Lomborg ed. 2004), and Frank Ackerman and Ian Finlayson, The Economics of
Inaction on Climate Change: A Sensitivity Analysis (forthcoming 2007), offer a picture of more serious
monetized damage from climate change.
55
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the bottom and the top, respectively. The United States, China, and Russia are expected
to lose relatively little from 2.5 C warming; indeed, Russia is expected to gain. By
contrast, India and Africa are anticipated to be massive losers. India is expected to
experience devastating losses in terms of both health and agriculture. Here too there is a
great deal of uncertainty, in part because of the difficulty of projecting future economic
growth and adaptation, and any point estimates must be taken with many grains of salt.
But in terms of health alone, India has been projected to lose 3,600,000 years of life
because of climate-related diseases, with 769,000 years of life lost from malaria alone.60
For Africa, the major problem involves health, with a massive anticipated increase in
climate-related diseases.61 Sub-Saharan Africa has been projected to lose 26,677,000
years of life because of climate-related diseases, with 24,385,000 coming from malaria.62
To be sure, the evidence here is somewhat dated as well as controversial, but
every existing estimate of the costs of climate change confirms that Africa and India are
particularly vulnerable.63 While other studies emphasize that China and the United States
have significant amounts to lose,64 no numerical estimate suggests that the two nations
are unusually vulnerable in terms of either agriculture or health.
It seems clear that the United States faces more limited threats on all relevant
dimensions.65 On some estimates, American agriculture will actually be a net winner as a
result of climate change.66 Consider one study of the long-run effects of climate change
on a range of economic variables in the United States.67 The study offers both optimistic
projections, including a high level of adaptation and low warming, and pessimistic
60

Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 81.
Id.
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., Tol, supra note; Stern, supra note.
64
See, e.g., Frumhoff et al., supra (cataloguing losses in Northeastern United States); Stern, supra note
(broadly outlining losses to developed world and also to China).
65
But see Frumhoff et al., supra note, at 67-80 (emphasizing adverse effects on agriculture); id at 91-104
(emphasizing adverse effects on health).
66
See Olivier Deschenes and Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence
from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuations of Weather (2006), available at http://www.aeibrookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1031; compare the suggestion in Nordhaus and Boyer, supra
note, at 97, that “the economic impact of gradual climate change (that is, omitting catastrophic outcomes) is
close to zero for a moderate (2.5 degree C) global warming.” Note that this conclusion does not come to
terms with the economic effects on the United States that would come from the very fact of serious
economic harms in other nations.
67
See Dale Jorgenson et al., U.S. Market Consequences of Global Climate Change (2004), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/marketconsequences; see also the brief
summary in Stern, supra note, at 147-148.
61
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projections, involving little adaptation and higher warming. For 3 C warming, the most
optimistic case projects an increase of one percent in GDP; the benefits are highest at 2 C
warming and decline from 3.5 C. The most pessimistic case projects losses of 1.2 percent
of GDP at 3 C. It should be clear that if the United States anticipates that it is not likely to
lose a great deal, on net, from climate change, its incentive to participate in an
international agreement will not be very high. And if the United States anticipates a
“worst case,” at 3 C warming, of 1.2 percent loss in GDP, the incentive is relatively
weak. Existing interest in unilateral action, within the United States, presents several
puzzles in this light; I will return to those puzzles below.
Like Russia, China has been projected to benefit in terms of agriculture, and while
it will suffer health losses, they have been estimated to be at least relatively modest, far
below those expected in Africa and India.68 As I have said, some accounts have found
that China would gain, on net, from warming.69 On one projection, China will lose
603,000 years of life from climate-related causes, and just 8000 from malaria.70 The loss
of 600,000 years of life is highly significant, but it is far below the corresponding losses
for the most threatened nations. To the extent that the losses are not overwhelming, we
might expect that China would be unlikely to be particularly interested in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, at least on these figures; thus far, the nation’s behavior is
consistent with that prediction. Note in this regard the striking fact that the citizens of
China and the United States are less concerned about climate change than are the citizens
of Japan, France, Spain, India, Britain, and Germany.71
C.

Emitting Nations

But how much do nations stand to lose from reductions? It is clear that the costs
of the Kyoto Protocol were anticipated to be especially high for the United States; indeed,
the costs for the United States would be much greater than the corresponding costs for
any other signatory nation, and probably for all other signatory nations combined.72
Unfortunately, we do not have recent estimates of the costs of emissions reductions for
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various nations. As a proxy for those costs, it makes sense to begin by seeing which
nations are principal contributors to the problem. If an international agreement is struck,
the largest contributors are likely to have to bear the highest costs. Suppose, for example,
that a worldwide carbon tax is imposed, beginning at a cost of $27 per metric ton.73 It
stands to reason that the largest carbon emitters would face the most significant burdens.
(I will qualify this point below.74)
It is important and true that a genuinely global emissions trading program would
reduce those burdens. If American companies can buy emissions credits from (say) India,
they should be able to comply with international obligations far more cheaply than if they
had to make reductions on their own.75 But even with global trading, large emitting
countries would bear large financial burdens.76
For democratic governments, this point evidently matters. Political leaders would
suffer serious electoral retribution if they proposed or adopted measures that would
produce significant increases in the cost of gasoline and electricity. Consider, for
example, a study by the Department of Energy, projecting that the Kyoto Protocol would
produce substantial gasoline price increases of 52 cents per gallon, and 20 percent to 86
percent increases in the price of electricity by 2010.77 If emissions reductions increased,
or were expected to increase, gasoline prices by any significant amount, public objections
would likely be vigorous, certainly to the extent that the price increases were understood
as an effort to reduce a speculative threat in the distant future. Americans are now
concerned about the problem of climate change and support the Kyoto Protocol, but they
are not (yet?) willing to bear significant costs in the form of increased gasoline or energy
prices.78 Nondemocratic leaders, such as those in China, have complex incentives of their
own.79 The only suggestion is that if significant emissions controls imposed large and
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palpable costs on the United States, officials would have to work very hard to convince
the public that the costs were justified – and perhaps that the United States is playing its
part in a genuine international effort, rather than as first-movers facing general
intransigence from other nations.
To get a handle on the problem, consider the following table, offering a snapshot
of global contributors in 2003 and 2004 (limited to carbon dioxide, the leading
greenhouse gas)80:
Table 4
Share of Global Emissions
2003
2004
United States
22.7% 22.0%
OECD Europe
16.9% 16.3%
China
15.3% 17.5%
India
4.1%
4.1%
Japan
4.9%
4.7%
Africa
3.5%
3.4%
Russia
4.2%
4.2%

As early as 2004, then, the United States and China emerged as the top emitters,
accounting for nearly 40% of the world’s total.81 If our goal is to project the costs of
emissions reductions in the future, of course, this chart does not tell us nearly enough; it
is necessary to understand the trends over time. The most significant contributors in the
past may not be the most significant contributors in the future. Existing projections
suggest that the largest contributors are likely to continue to qualify as such—but that
major shifts will occur, above all with explosive emissions growth in China and India,
and emissions reductions in Russia and Germany.
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Table 5
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Changes, 1990–200482
Countries
China
United States
India
South Korea
Iran
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Spain
Pakistan
Poland
EU-25
Germany
Ukraine
Russia

1990–2004
108.3%
19.8%
87.5%
104.6%
110.7%
137.7%
85.6%
67.8%
59.0%
96.6%
-15.3%
1.6%
-12.2%
-47.1%
-24.8%

Here we can see rapid emissions increases in some places, above all China, South Korea,
Iran, Indonesian, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. With these trend lines, we can project
changes by 2030. At that time, the developing world is expected to contribute no less
than 55% of total emissions, with 45% coming from developed nations.83 At that time,
the United States is expected to be well below China. Consider the figures for anticipated
growth:
Table 6
Average Annual Projected Changes in CO2 Emissions 2004-203084
Country
India
Mexico
China
Brazil
South Korea
OECD Europe
United States
World

High Economic
Growth Case
3%
2.7%
3.8%
2.8%
1.8%
0.6%
1.5%
2.2%

Reference Case
2.6%
2.3%
3.4%
2.3%
1.3%
0.3%
1.1%
1.8%

82

Low Economic
Growth Case
2.2%
1.9%
3.0%
1.7%
0.7%
-0.1%
0.7%
1.4%

Emissions of CO2 from energy-related sources only. See International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions
From Fuel Combustion 1971-2004: 2006 Edition, pp. II.4-II.7
83
Own calculations based on US IEA, supra note.
84
Id.
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Table 7
Percentage Change in CO2 Emissions Projected 2004-203085
Country

High Economic
Growth Case
116%
102%
167%
104%
60%
17%
47%
77%

Reference Case

India
Mexico
China
Brazil
South Korea
OECD Europe
United States
World

94%
82%
139%
79%
39%
7%
34%
59%

Low Economic
Growth Case
74%
63%
115%
57%
21%
-3%
21%
43%

There are several key points here. China’s growth rate is more than double the
world’s average. While China and the United States had essentially the same level of
aggregate emissions in 2007, China’s emissions are projected to grow over three times as
rapidly as those of the United States. And on this projection, China’s growth rate will
dwarf the corresponding rates of India, Mexico, and South Korea. In terms of aggregate
contributions, these changes mean that there will be significant shifts among contributors:
Table 8
Relative Contributions of Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Country/Region
86
(Approximate % of Worldwide Emissions)
United States
OECD Europe
China
India
Japan
Africa

1990
23.5%
19.3%
10.5%
2.7%
4.8%
3.1%

2003
22.7%
16.9%
15.3%
4.1%
4.9%
3.5%

2004
22.0%
16.3%
17.5%
4.1%
4.7%
3.4%

2010
20.1%
14.6%
21.1%
4.2%
4.1%
3.7%

2015
19.4%
13.4%
22.4%
4.4%
3.8%
3.8%

2020
18.8%
12.4%
23.9%
4.7%
3.5%
3.9%

2025
18.7%
11.6%
25.0%
4.9%
3.3%
3.9%

2030
18.5%
10.9%
26.2%
5.0%
3.0%
3.9%

This projection, suggesting that by 2030 China’s emissions will be 50% higher
than those of the United States, is fairly recent; but with explosive emissions growth in
China, it is already out of date. China is now believed to have passed the United States in
CO2 emissions as early as 2007 and possibly before.87
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D.

The Problem

We can now identify a real obstacle to an international agreement to control
greenhouse gases. The United States and China are the largest emitters, and at least on
prominent projections, they also stand to lose relatively less from climate change. In
terms of their own domestic self-interest, these projections weaken the argument for
stringent controls. The nations of Africa stand to lose a great deal, but they are trivial
greenhouse gas emitters; they have every reason to favor aggressive reductions but
cannot even dent the problem on their own. India may be even more vulnerable, and its
contribution, while rapidly growing and far from trivial, is comparatively modest. India
too should favor aggressive reductions, but its own unilateral steps would essentially
contribute nothing to solving the problem.
For complex reasons, the United States might nonetheless prove willing to
undertake significant reductions, but the incentive problem is especially serious for
China. A poor nation is unlikely to spend a great deal to reduce a danger that may not
materialize for decades and whose magnitude, at least for China, remains at least to some
degree speculative. With so many economic problems to solve, and with a high degree of
poverty, climate change may well seem a low priority.88 By contrast, a wealthy nation is
in a much better position to purchase insurance against the risk of future catastrophe.89
For this reason it is reasonable to expect that the United States would be more inclined to
take aggressive precautionary steps than China. But it remains true that on prominent
projections, the world's leading emitters are similarly situated in the sense that significant
emissions reductions would impose high costs for gains that are far lower than those
anticipated in (say) India and Africa.
It follows that the current situation is no simple prisoner’s dilemma, in which
nations lose from unilateral action but gain from enforceable limitations on one another’s
behavior. Even though an international agreement would be in the world’s interest, taking
the world as a whole,90 neither China or the United States might perceive such an
agreement as in their interest, simply because both nations seem to have
disproportionately little to lose from climate change and disproportionately much to lose
88
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from emissions reductions. More precisely, the agreement that is optimal from the
standpoint of the world might not be optimal from the standpoint of the United States and
China. If the world would do best with a worldwide tax of (say) $40 per ton of carbon,
the United States might do best with a worldwide tax of $20 per ton of carbon, and China
with a worldwide tax of $10 per ton of carbon.
Actually the analysis has an additional complexity. Some nations, above all
China, might reasonably object that their own contribution is much smaller than the
aggregate figures suggest. In assessing relative contributions, we might be interested in
cumulative emissions rather than annual emissions.91 The overall stock matters, not only
the current flow. Here is the relevant data:
Table 9
Cumulative CO2 Emissions, 1850–200292
Countries
United States
EU-25
Russia
China
Germany
United Kingdom
Japan
France
India
Ukraine

29.3
26.5
8.1
7.6
7.3
6.3
4.1
2.9
2.2
2.2

Notice in this regard that for a long period, China’s emissions were a small
fraction of those of the United States. Even though China’s emissions rates have now
passed those of the United States, it might well insist that it should not bear the same
economic burden as a nation that is responsible for a much larger percentage of aggregate
emissions. Perhaps the economic burden should be a product of total contribution to the
problem, extending over time.
China might well add that its per capita emissions are far lower than those of the
United States. Consider the following table of per capita emissions in 2004:
91
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Table 10
Tons of CO2 Emitted Per Capita in 200493
United States
19.73
EU-25
8.46
Russia
10.63
China
3.66
Germany
10.29
United Kingdom
8.98
Japan
9.52
France
6.22
India
1.02
Ukraine
6.42

Notwithstanding its status as the largest emitter on the planet, China's per capita
emissions are only one-fifth those of the United States, and they remain well below those
of many nations, including Russia, Germany, Japan, France, and Ukraine. Invoking the
disparities traced above, China might insist, not implausibly, that per capita emissions are
what matter. To see the intuition behind the point, imagine a world with three nations,
having populations of one billion, one hundred million, and one million. Imagine too that
all three nations have the same level of aggregate greenhouse gas emissions – and that the
third nation, with a much higher per capita emissions rate, asks the other two to scale
back their emissions by the same rate. The nation with one billion people would quite
plausibly say that what matters is the per capita rate, and that it is absurd to think that a
nation with one million people should be entitled to have the same aggregate emissions
rate as a nation with a billion.
The debate over per capita emissions thus matters to an evaluation of appropriate
policy. To be sure, no one doubts that the purely domestic calculus—of costs and
benefits—will play a significant role in any nation’s decisions. But fairness judgments,
attending to cumulative contributions and to per capita rates, are unlikely to be entirely
irrelevant.94
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III.

Solutions?

If the United States and China are to agree to emissions limitations, a method
must be found to overcome their complex incentives. The first method would appeal to
self-interest; the second would attempt moral suasion. If general international practice is
the guide, the first method is far more likely to work,95 but we cannot exclude the
possibility that one or both nations might respond to moral arguments.
A.

A Puzzle

There is a puzzle to be underlined at the outset: Notwithstanding what I have said
thus far, unilateral action by the United States has attracted considerable support at the
national and state levels, and it is fully possible that national emissions limits will be
enacted relatively soon. As early as June 22, 2005, a 53–44 majority of the United States
Senate approved a “sense of the Senate” resolution to the effect that “Congress should
enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory market-based limits
and incentives on greenhouse gases that slow, stop and reverse the growth of such
emissions . . . .”96 A fairly aggressive legislative proposal, from Senators John McCain
and Joseph Lieberman in 2003, would have capped greenhouse gas emissions at 2000
levels. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 55–43.97 But many prominent members of
Congress have supported similar legislation,98 and prominent companies, including Duke
Energy and Alabama Power, have supported emissions limits.99 There seems to be little
legislative support for a carbon tax,100 but it would not be at all surprising to find some
kind of national “cap-and-trade” program in the near future.
Far more has already happened at the state level. In December 2005, the
governors of seven states signed a Memorandum of Understanding, designed to create a
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regional “cap-and-trade” plan to reduce power plant emissions.101 The mayors of over
200 cities, including over 43 million Americans, have pledged to meet city-level goals
corresponding with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.102 In June 2005, Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger pledged to reduce California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels by 2020, a pledge that helped lead to the West Coast Governor’s Global Warming
Initiative, which includes California, Washington, and Oregon.103 California has enacted
legislation to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from automobiles, with a 22%
reduction target by 2012 and a 30% reduction target by 2016.104
If the analysis thus far is correct, these proposals and steps are indeed puzzling.
Why do national legislators support unilateral measures that would cost a significant
amount but deliver relatively small domestic benefits? Why do state officials favor steps
that would do essentially nothing to reduce the problem of climate change, but that would
impose real costs on their citizens? I will attempt to answer these questions below.
B.

Self-Interest

The most obvious solution would show that the numbers given above are
outdated, misleading, incomplete, or simply wrong. Suppose that it could be established
that the United States and China do, in fact, have a great deal to lose from climate
change.105 Suppose that both nations could be convinced that the likely damage is very
serious, far more so than the foregoing figures suggest.106 In that event, the problem of
unfortunate incentives would be greatly reduced. It should be clear that many of those
interested in counteracting the problem of climate change have attempted to alter those
incentives in exactly this way, by pointing to worst-case scenarios from which the United
States would be greatly threatened.107 Available incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina,
might well heighten concern within the United States.108 But an obvious question is
whether sustained analysis might support that concern.
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1. Risks. Some projections do suggest that the United States may well have a great
deal to lose. For catastrophic events, consider the following table109:
Table 11
Percentage Loss of GDP from Catastrophic Warming
United States
22.1
China
22.1
Japan
22.1
OECD Europe
44.2
Russia
33.2
India
44.2
Eastern Europe
22.1
Africa
22.1

If the risk of catastrophe is perceived as high,110 the threat to China and the United
States becomes far more severe – comparable, in fact, to the threats to Japan and Africa.
For the United States, some pessimistic scenarios do suggest significant risks well
short of catastrophe. A “business as usual” approach has been projected to create
exceedingly serious problems for the Northeast, including increased flooding, adverse
effects on agriculture, and serious health problems.111 One high climate change scenario
projects an annual average of 13,080 additional deaths during the period 2000-2100.112
Because motor vehicle accidents produce over 40,000 each year, 13,080 may not appear
so alarmingly high; but to put it vividly, this figure suggests that climate change would
ensure, each year, deaths equivalent to those that would come from six attacks on the
order of those of September 11, 2001. A similarly pessimistic scenario suggests 39
percent average annual percentage decreases in agricultural productivity and 31.3 percent
average annual percentage increases in water costs.113 To the extent that science
converges on figures of this sort, the United States will have a much stronger incentive to
seek an international agreement. And if low discount rates are used, annual GDP losses
for developed nations as a whole have been projected at about 5 percent and possibly
109
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higher by 2100.114 Of course a longer time horizon, projecting until (say) 2200, will find
correspondingly more serious risks, if only because of increased warming under
“business as usual” approaches.
There are other possibilities. Emissions reductions might produce an array of
ancillary benefits. Emissions limitations might yield a “national security dividend,”
stemming from decreased reliance on foreign oil.115 To the extent that this dividend can
be monetized, or at least included in the overall analysis, emissions reductions might
seem more desirable even if the climate change gains are fairly modest. An international
accord might also promote commercial opportunities for American firms, not least in
connection with emissions trading and technology transfer.116 And to the extent that
United States participation in such an accord might provide strategic benefits, by
allowing bargaining on a number of related issues (including the war against terrorism),
the argument on its behalf is evidently stronger.117
Detailed studies of the potential effects of climate change do not appear to exist
for China, but many scenarios suggest significant harm.118 A national report in 2007,
China’s National Climate Change Programme,119 suggests a range of serious risks,
including rising sea levels, greater desertification, retreat of glaciers, and more frequent
occurrence of extreme weather/climate events including floods and droughts, with large
adverse effects on socio-economic development. To the extent that findings of this kind
suggest that China has a great deal at stake, the incentive to join an international
agreement will obviously increase.
2. Decreased costs. The United States was the leading producer of ozonedepleting chemicals, suggesting that the United States would be most likely to resist
strong controls on such chemicals. But as the controversy intensified, the incentives of
American companies turned out to be radically different from what many people
anticipated. A key reason is that DuPont, the principal American producer of CFCs, was
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able to develop relatively inexpensive substitutes.120 As a result, DuPont actually had an
incentive to favor aggressive regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals, because such
regulation could increase its market share. Because DuPont expected to turn out to be the
leading producer of CFC substitutes, aggressive regulation was in its interest.
More generally, American producers saw that good commercial opportunities lay
in the development and marketing of new products for which they had a comparative
advantage over foreign producers.121 Consider the companies’ warning “that international
cooperation was essential, and that participation in an agreement to phase out CFCs
needed to be as broad as possible, to avoid production by other manufacturers relocating
to non-signatory states.”122 It is noteworthy in this regard that the European Community
speculated that the Reagan Administration’s support for aggressive controls was driven
by the fact that American producers had “developed substitutes.”123
This example suggests a promising possibility: Perhaps the United States or
(less likely) China will innovate, ensuring that domestic companies will benefit from
aggressive regulation of greenhouse gases. If one or another nation believes that it is
innovating, or might innovate, in a way that will produce significant economic benefits
from aggressive regulation, the argument for greenhouse gas reductions will be doubly
strengthened. First, the cost of such reductions will decrease. Second, a nation’s
companies might actually gain if other nations are looking for less expensive substitutes.
To be sure, there is no evidence, to date, that this will occur nearly as quickly or easily
for greenhouse gases as it did in the context of ozone-depleting chemicals.124 But
technology-forcing efforts have not been seriously ventured in the United States, and they
might well produce valuable innovations.125
Return in this regard to California’s aggressive emissions reduction
initiative,126 which is not easy to justify on conventional cost-benefit grounds.127 Standing

120

See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note.
Id.
122
Scott Barrett, Environment & Statecraft 234 (2005).
123
James Hammitt, Stratospheric-Ozone Depletion, in Economic Analyses At EPA 131, 157 (Richard
Morgenstern ed. 1997).
124
See Sandler, supra note.
125
See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2005).
126
Robert Stavins et al., Too Good to be True? An Examination of Three Economic Assessments of
California’s Climate Change Policy (2007), available at
http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1151
121

25

by itself, the California initiative will cost a significant amount but deliver few benefits to
California or the world.128 (Recall the reason: If California reduces its own emissions,
and the rest of the world does not do the same, the impact on climate change will be close
to zero.129) One argument in favor of California’s initiative is that it will stimulate
innovation that will ultimately benefit the innovators, which, it is hoped, will be in
California. More generally, the costs of regulation often turn out to be lower than
anticipated.130 Perhaps the projections for the United States and China are inflated,
simply because technological innovations will drive down the cost of compliance. If this
is so, and if prominent officials can be persuaded that it is so, the likelihood of a
regulatory response will be increased.
Some evidence supports the view that the costs might be significantly lower
than expected. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that global
emissions could be reduced 15% below their year-2000 levels using nothing but existing
technology at a negative or zero net cost.131 On this admittedly optimistic (and probably
unrealistic) account,132 the energy savings would pay for themselves. There is also
evidence that promising technologies could significantly decrease the costs of stabilizing
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. For example, carbon capture
and storage (CCS) is an existing technology that, if deployed on a global scale, could
decrease the cost of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of carbon at 450 ppm by the
year 2100 by as much as 40%.133 CCS involves the capture of CO2 from a fixed source,
such as a coal-fired power plant, and the long-term storage of that CO2 deep underground
or in the ocean.134 This approach would have large advantages for China, which could
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continue using its coal-fired power plants while reducing emissions by perhaps as much
as 90%.135
CCS remains a highly speculative possibility; it is currently unknown whether
the geological storage capacity exists on the global scale needed to deploy this
technology, and there are risks of leakage of CO2 from the storage sites.136 But if these
problems can be overcome, the costs of mitigation could become low enough to make
aggressive reductions far more attractive.
3. Special provisions and side-payments. I have noted that if the world stands
to gain from an emissions control agreement, and if China and the United States believe
that they stand to lose, the efficient solution is clear. The world should reach an
agreement that produces the optimal reductions, and China and the United States should
be compensated for their willingness to participate in that agreement. No one is now
suggesting that the United States should receive such compensation. But it has indeed
been suggested that China might have to be “paid to play.”137 And with respect to China,
it turns out that there is at least a partial precedent for this solution.
In the context of ozone-depleting chemicals, the developing countries were
initially skeptical about the idea that they should be subject to the restrictions of the
Montreal Protocol.138 Their skepticism was easy to defend by reference to domestic selfinterest. For poor nations, such restrictions would impose significant costs for speculative
gains. Self-interest aside, such nations plausibly contended that they should not be
subjected to the same controls as wealthier nations, which were responsible for the
problem in the first place. India and China emphasized that nations with less than 25
percent of the world’s population had been responsible for over 90 percent of the world’s
CFCs.139
But wealthy nations could not easily be content with an agreement excluding
developing countries. While CFC consumption was low in those countries, their domestic
requirements were increasing,140 and a badly designed agreement could merely shift the
production and use of CFCs from wealthy nations to poorer ones, leaving the global
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problem largely unaffected. The ultimate resolution was to overcome the resistance of the
developing nations with several steps, including both loosened restrictions and financial
assistance. Under Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, developing countries are authorized
to meet “basic domestic needs” by increasing to a specified level for ten years, after
which they are subject to a 50 percent reduction for the next ten years. In addition, a
funding mechanism was created by which substantial resources—initially $400 million—
were transferred to poor countries.141
Might it be possible to build on these ideas for climate change142? Let us focus
on China, which presents the easier case. Suppose that a worldwide carbon tax would be
desirable,143 but that China resists taking action that would mostly benefit other nations.
If so, it would not be at all surprising if wealthy nations decided to make special
provision for China (and other developing nations).144 In 2001, the Marrakech accords led
to innovations from the Kyoto Protocol, in which developing countries were made
beneficiaries of funds to assist with technology transfer.145 Although the level of the
funds remains unspecified, donors led by the European Union pledged to grant $410
million annually.146 For China’s participation, the most promising route would be to take
steps to make emissions reduction in that nation’s self-interest. We could imagine four
possibilities here: (a) technology transfers; (b) extended compliance periods,147 building
on the Kyoto Protocol; (c) allocation of large initial emissions rights, perhaps based
partly on per capita emissions, that would reduce the overall cost148; and (d) direct cash
payments. The most obvious solution might well be (c), in the form of “headroom
allowances,” giving China a range of rights that it can trade to wealthy nations or hold
itself in the event of continuing spurts in economic growth.149
Efforts to compensate China for emissions reductions are closely analogous to
other measures through which the victims of pollution are asked to pay a polluter to
141
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reduce its polluting activity.150 Under certain circumstances, this approach is efficient, in
the sense that it will produce the optimal activity level, and also desirable from the
standpoint of distributional equity, because the polluters (and those who benefit from
polluting activity) are less wealthy than are the victims. For a mundane example, consider
the idea of “cash for clunkers,” by which owners of old, high-polluting vehicles are paid
to retire their cars. The owners of such cars are disproportionately poor, and hence the
relevant programs might be defended on distributional grounds at the same time that they
promote social welfare.
On plausible assumptions, this is a sensible approach to take to climate change.
To be sure, it is possible to object on grounds of corrective justice: Why should the
victims of pollution be asked to pay polluters to get them to stop? Why should the world
pay China to persuade it to cease imposing risks on the rest of the world? Such questions
might be decisive in the context of intentional or reckless wrongdoing, but they may well
point in the wrong direction in the context of the unintended side-effects of otherwise
desirable activity.151 Imagine, for example, that a company in New York is employing
large numbers of poor workers, who would lose their jobs if the company were forced to
close; imagine too that the company’s actions produce pollution that harms the wealthiest
people in (say) Albany. It might well be best to ask the wealthy citizens of Albany to pay
the company, and its workers, to cease their activity.152 Indeed, if China’s relatively low
per-capita emissions are taken into account, it might be tempting to argue that those who
emit more on a per capita basis have a moral obligation to compensate China for its
reductions.
But if distributional considerations are kept in mind, there is an evident
complication here. Many citizens of China are wealthy, and many citizens of (say)
Africa, India, Germany, and France are poor. If distributional considerations are what
matter, it is not at all clear that the citizens of the world should pay the citizens of China
to reduce their emissions.153 Even if the paying nations were mostly wealthy, it remains
true that millions of citizens of wealthy nations are poor, and a payment from (say) the
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United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada to China might well hurt
millions of poor people. On the other hand, it would be easy to imagine a side-payment,
or an allocation of emissions rights, that was generally desirable on distributive grounds,
even if it did not operate as a pure or simple transfer from rich to poor.
Now turn to the United States. On efficiency grounds, the analysis is the same
as for China. If the United States would be a net loser from an international agreement,
the United States might be compensated for its participation. But the analysis of
distributional issues is different. The United States has the one of the highest per capita
income rates on the planet, and the citizens of India, Africa, Germany, and France are not
likely to want to pay the United States to scale back its emissions. Of course the United
States is not a person, and perhaps poor Americans would benefit from such payments.
On the other hand, there is a clear and probably decisive pragmatic obstacle to any claim
that the United States should be paid for its participation: Other nations are most unlikely
to be willing to do that. But an analysis of the underlying issues requires a direct
engagement with the moral issues.
C.

Moral Considerations

Suppose that for one or another reason, the United States and China do conclude
that they have comparatively little to lose from climate change, and that aggressive
emissions restrictions would impose significant economic burdens on them. Suppose too
that climate change will impose severe harm on many nations, causing (for example)
millions of premature deaths in Africa and India. If so, there remains a strong argument
that the United States and China should reduce their emissions, regardless of how much
the citizens in the United States and China have to gain from those reductions.154 The
adverse effects on Africa and India might even be considered a tort, in the form of a
nuisance imposed on them by the United States and China.155 For example, energy and
gasoline prices in the United States have been far lower than they would have been if
those prices had included an amount attributable to the increased risks of climate change.
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Perhaps the United States and China might be persuaded to act on the ground that they
have a moral obligation to do so.
Within the United States, many billions of dollars are spent each year on foreign
aid,156 and an international agreement to control global environmental problems might
operate as a form of such aid. Perhaps the United States might be willing to compensate
developing nations for the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and to provide aid
for them. There can be little doubt that with respect to domestic climate change initiatives
in the United States, a perception of moral obligations has played a significant role.157
There seems to be an unruly combination of arguments from corrective justice and
arguments from distributional equity.
We can make some progress here by noticing that in three ways, the analysis of
the moral obligations of the United States is different from the corresponding analysis for
China. First, the United States has contributed far more to the existing “stock” of
greenhouse gases.158 Even if its contributions will be lower than those of China in the
future, the significant American contribution to the stock must be taken into account.
This is a point about corrective justice. Second, the United States is much richer than
China, and ability to pay is surely relevant to the overall assessment. This is a point about
distributive justice. I have noted that because the United States is wealthier than China, it
is more likely to reduce risks that will come to fruition in the future; for the same reason,
the United States might be thought to be under a special obligation to protect those
nations that most threatened. Third, the United States has by far the highest per capita
emission rate, and it is plausible to think that the per capita rate is relevant to a nation’s
moral obligations. We have seen that while China is the largest emitter of any nation, its
per capita emissions rate rank it far below many nations. None of this means that China is
not obliged to take action as well. But China might well resist the claim that its
obligations are akin to those of the United States.
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The analysis of moral obligations must disentangle the three considerations
referred to above.159 The obligations of wealthy nations present a simple question of
distributional fairness; the climate change setting is not unique on that count. It may well
be true that the United States should be transferring significant sums of money to China,
or to poor people in China, but it is not doing so. This point suggests a clear political
constraint on the use of distributive arguments as a basis for policy. In any case there is
an intergenerational question here, one that complicates distributional arguments in the
context of climate change: People in the future will almost certainly be wealthier than
people in the present.160 If the United States seeks to distribute resources to poor people
in India and Africa, there is a much stronger argument for distributing resources to poor
people now living in India and Africa than for distributing to future poor people in India
and Africa. On the other hand, it remains true that if redistribution from rich to poor is
desirable, climate change policy might serve, if crudely, to promote that goal.
The question of past contributions raises separate issues.161 To simplify the
analysis, let us begin by assuming that nations should be treated as if they were people
with very long lives. With this assumption, it makes sense to come to terms with past
contributions by asking nations to participate in the creation of some kind of fund for
climate change damages, with their participation reflecting their contributions to the total
existing stock of emissions. China need not contribute much to such a fund; the United
States would be required to contribute a great deal. A step of this kind would be a
sensible response to the fact, shown by the table above, that different nations have added
dramatically different amounts to the current situation. A separate step would involve the
response to existing flows. Perhaps a “polluters pay” principle could be made a part of an
international agreement, so that nations would pay an amount to reflect their continuing
contributions.162
This approach to past emissions “stocks” does elide two important problems.163
The first is that most of the emissions by the United States occurred in periods in which
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the United States did not know or have reason to know of the risk of harm. Should
climate change be seen as a kind of strict liability tort, or must some kind of negligence
be shown? The second problem is that many of the beneficiaries of greenhouse gas
emissions, in the United States, are long dead. Should their descendents have to pay for
those emissions? Perhaps the answer is yes, if those descendants have benefited from the
emissions. But is it so clear that current Americans are beneficiaries of emissions from
(say) 1900-1950, such that they should be expected to pay the citizens of the world for
those contributions? In this respect, the climate change problem has some overlap with
seemingly unrelated domains in which reparations are sought from the descendants of
wrongdoers.164 It is not clear, in short, that the idea of corrective justice is well-suited to
climate change.165
The question of whether per capita emissions should be taken into account
presents thorny ethical and pragmatic problems. China argues that any international
agreement should consider the fact that its large aggregate emissions disguise the fact that
its per capita emissions rate is not terribly high. We have seen that nations are not people
and it is highly artificial to say that a nation with a large population should be allocated
the same emissions rights as a nation with a much smaller population. It is clear that the
United States would not accept any agreement in which emissions rights are allocated on
a per capita basis. But it is also clear that China’s immense population, and its
comparatively low per capita emissions rate, might well be relevant to a bargain. The
problem is that any effort to base an international agreement on per capita rates is really a
claim for large-scale redistribution across nations, and it is not clear why the United
States should agree to such redistribution if it is not doing so already – especially to the
extent that the United States does not perceive itself as gravely threatened by climate
change.
D

Of Confusion, Hope, and Morality

Notwithstanding the thrust of my argument here, aggressive action by the
United States, and indeed unilateral action, would not exactly be a stunning surprise.
Indeed, it is reasonable to predict that such action will occur, at the national level, in the
164
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next few years. Recall that unilateral action has already obtained considerable support in
Congress. Recall too that California has required significant steps on its own, even
though the cost is likely to be significant and the benefits are likely to be essentially zero.
How can such support, and California’s actual legislation, be plausibly explained?
The best answer points to the relationship between moral considerations and a
mixture of confusion and hope. In many domains, the problem on which I have been
focusing is not widely understood; many people appear not to appreciate the fact that
significant steps, by states or even regions, will have no significant impact on climate
change. On one estimate, the Kyoto Protocol was expected to reduce warming by only
0.03 C by 2100, even though many nations were involved166; a key reason is that the
Kyoto Protocol does not control the explosive growth in emissions from developing
nations. It follows that by itself, California’s initiative will do exceedingly little to reduce
warming. It is not at all clear that those who supported the initiative appreciated that fact.
But there is a hope here, not merely confusion. The hope is reflected in the
thought that if California acts, other states might do so as well, eventually to be followed
by the nation as a whole, and eventually by other nations as well. Perhaps a single state,
or at least one as large as California, can start a cascade.167 Many of those who call for
unilateral action by the United States might know that by itself, such action will do very
little about the anticipated warming. They might well believe that the developing nations,
most importantly China, are most unlikely to act if the United States does not do so, and
that action by the United States is an indispensable start toward an agreement of the sort
that is generally believed to be in the world’s interest.168 On this view, a cap-and-trade
program by the United States might be the beginning of an implicit deal, in the form of a
showing of good faith, to which other nations might eventually respond.
Note in this connection that unilateral action has the advantage of being
reversible. California’s emissions reductions requirements need not be met until 2025. If
the cost of meeting the requirements turns out to high, if no cascade has started, and if the
science looks less favorably on aggressive action, the requirements can be relaxed or
166
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eliminated. The United States might itself adopt an aggressive emissions reductions
program on the explicit or implicit assumption that other nations, including the
developing ones, will act as well. If no such action is forthcoming, the American program
might become more lenient.
To these points it might be added that unilateral action could spur
technological innovation that would be in the interest of the United States as well as the
world as a whole.169 Because the United States is quite wealthy, what might otherwise be
a significant "investment" in the reduction of the risk of climate change might not be so
damaging. For those who believe that national policy should be based on domestic selfinterest, there is an evident problem with these arguments for unilateral action: Even if
international action does follow, it is not clear that the domestic benefits of greenhouse
gas reduction would justify the domestic costs. But for reasons explored above, the
existing numbers, raising doubts about the domestic cost-benefit analysis, may not be the
right ones.
Conclusion
If the world consisted of simply one nation, it would probably have little
difficulty in settling on significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, either through
a cap-and-trade system170 or (possibly better still171) through a carbon tax. And if the
world’s leading emitters also had a great deal to lose from climate change, the problem
would be more tractable, simply because those nations would seek an international
accord. The easiest situation would be one in which the principal emitters would gain
from unilateral action, as in the context of ozone-depleting chemicals. The problem of
climate change does not have this characteristic. Neither the United States nor China
would gain much from unilateral action, which would also impose significant costs. On
existing projections, the two nations’ complex incentives raise questions about
participation in an international agreement that requires large reductions; and both
nations’ actions to date reflect the power of those incentives. Perhaps these projections
are wrong, but they continue to shape climate change policy in both nations. The United
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States and China might reasonably believe that an agreement that is optimal for the world
is not optimal for the United States and China.
It is obvious that the United States and China would be more likely to
participate in an international agreement if the perceived costs decreased or if the
perceived benefits increased. The simplest way to decrease the perceived costs would
involve technological innovation, for example via energy sources that do not produce
high levels of carbon emissions. The simplest way to increase the perceived benefits
would involve clearer evidence of significant losses for both nations; if the risk of
catastrophic outcomes is perceived as real, the benefits assessment would change
accordingly.172 Ancillary benefits, involving (for example) energy self-sufficiency and
national security, could also alter the calculus.
It is far from clear that either the United States or China would be willing to
sacrifice large sums of money simply because of a perception of their moral obligations.
But there can be no doubt that a sense of moral obligation is playing a significant role in
both national and international debates, especially with respect to the actions of the
United States. Because the citizens of Africa and India have a great deal to lose, and
indeed because millions of lives are at risk, there is good reason for the United States and
China to act whether or not such action is in their self-interest.173 Because of its wealth,
its high per capita emissions rate, and its past contributions, the moral obligations of the
United States are especially insistent. What remains clear is that the United States cannot
do much about the problem without the participation of developing countries, above all
China. For this reason, it is appropriate for the United States to take active steps, perhaps
including unilateral action, in order to increase the likelihood that such countries will be
willing to participate in the future.
Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@midway.uchicago.edu
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